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 MY “VERY IDEA” OF ROD — AND YOURS 
Remarks to the Symposium on the Legal Imagination of Rod Macdonald 
McGill University 





Introducing a symposium on the legal imagination of Rod Macdonald would be a 
daunting task under any circumstances.   It is made even more so by the constraints 
under which I labour.  I can’t hope to match the comprehensive overview that Andrée 
Lajoie provides in the book she will launch this afternoon.  Nor can I compete with the 
focused exploration of specific aspects of Rod’s work which will be offered by the six 
panels scheduled for today and tomorrow.   Nor, because he has forbidden us to be 
maudlin,  can I do what I would like most to do — to spend the next half hour expressing 
my admiration and affection for  Rod.  I have therefore taken my clue from something 
Rod says frequently and in various formulations:  “The very idea of law [he says] must 
be autobiographical”.1  If that’s true, then the “very idea” of Rod himself must be 
“autobiographical”. I’m therefore going to begin our symposium by sharing my 
autobiographical —  and consequently idiosyncratic — idea of Rod and his work.  This  
idea has been shaped by our many encounters over some four decades.  It may not 
accord with  your idea  of Rod’s scholarship or, for that matter, with his.  However, as 
Rod himself  strongly advocates “pluralizing the legal subject”, it will  be interesting to 
see what happens when we put his theory into practice. 
For convenience’s sake, I’m going to engage with  four aspects of his work that have 
variously impressed, persuaded, puzzled and exasperated me — sometimes all at 
once.  Specifically, I’m going to say something about Rod’s antipathy to borders and 
boundaries;  about his relentless search for virtue;  about his style of argumentation; 





Savant sans frontières 
We live in a world where in many respects borders seem to be hardening —  borders 
between nations,  classes, religions, cultures, ethnicities,  epistemologies, ideologies, 
professional specialisms, academic disciplines and  legal regimes, to name a few.  They 
are hardening despite the Enlightenment, despite technology,  despite globalization 
and, alas, despite the best efforts of Roderick A. Macdonald.  Rod  rejects borders. 
“Personal” or “political” or “professional”:  for Rod these are just labels that obscure 
more than they reveal.  Teacher or student: for Rod both are equal partners in the 
search for understanding.   Mathematics or music,  genetics or jurisprudence, it’s all the 
same to him:  just another useful way of looking at life.  High law or low law, common 
law or civil law:  all  way stations  along Rod’s trans-systemic, trans-disciplinary road to 
better understanding.   Building docks in Ontario’s cottage country or  creating a legal 
framework for secured transactions in the Ukraine: for  Rod these are just occasions for 
shaping appropriate responses  to  people’s particular  circumstances and varied needs.    
In short,  Rod is  the quintessential savant  sans frontières.  He constantly demonstrates 
how and why we must deconstruct concepts and break down categories that  impede 
the  search for understanding,  justice and virtue.   He does this by insisting,  not only on 
the possibility of  integrating all forms of knowledge, but on the inevitability of people’s 
interconnectedness, on the inescapable mixité  of communities,  on the hybridity of 
institutions and the contingency of rules and, above all,  on the role of the individual as 
the ultimate  source and destination of legal and moral knowledge, agency and 
responsibility.   
Rod’s open borders policy makes huge intellectual demands on him and, frankly, on his 
readers.   In one recent article, for example, Rod discusses musicology, biology and 
virology as metaphors for norm migration.2   However, after ensuring that readers have 
mastered these difficult subjects, he rejects them all and takes refuge on  the moral high 
ground of  Aristotelian philosophy.  Why, I am tempted to ask, did he not start where he 
was ultimately going to end up?  The answer surely is that for Rod, the journey — the 
border-crossing — is at least as important as the destination.      
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In search of virtue  
But the destination is important too.  Rod is always searching for virtue, for the moral 
high ground.  This will become clear in the panel discussions, especially those 
concerned with fairness and with  distributive justice.   However, it is the moral 
dimension  of his search that I want to comment on.  In the article I’ve just referred to, 
Rod relies on the  concept of phronesis, which is central to his own thinking.  Rod  
explains phronesis: 
… [T]he capacity to be sensitive to the particularities of a given situation is a 
necessary condition for moral agency. Even if universal moral principles were to 
exist, they would not be self-applying. The moral agent … is never relieved of the 
responsibility for making decisions. As moral agents we must therefore 
constantly reassess what it is we think we know. This, in turn, means cultivating 
openness to and reciprocity with others.3  
So far so good.  However, the article dealt with  attempts to  standardize certain rules of 
international trade law.   As far as I have been able to observe, “cultivating openness to 
and reciprocity with others” has not been a prominent feature of the so-called 
Washington Consensus, nor of regimes of trade law, nor of actual-existing international 
business relationships.  “Openness” and “reciprocity”, I contend, are likely to become 
more widespread (if at all) only with a change in power relations, which is to say only 
after the current model of U.S.-led neo-liberal globalization enters its declining stages.   
 
In his work, if only occasionally, Rod acknowledges the existence of power:   
 
Human beings are social animals who find meaning in the relationships they 
build with others [he says somewhere]  but  …[s]adly, these relationships are not 
always bilateral or equitable, for human beings in the Western cultural tradition 
also appear to have an insatiable appetite to project their views about life, 
community, social organization, spirituality and justice onto others ….  through … 
episodic violence; … through psychological manipulation; … through religious 
crusades, … and sometimes by economic coercion …. 4  
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If our appetite for power and domination is indeed insatiable, if the means we are 
prepared to use are so despicable, how does this square with our innate responsibility 
and capacity as moral agents?   In Rod’s view  this  contradiction is attributable  in part 
to our reliance on  the state.  He characterizes the state as  “the primary vehicle for self-
assertion and domination of the other” and he insists that “whether exercised for 
malignant or benign purposes, political power … tends toward authoritarian 
subjugation”.5     
 
How, then, does he  propose to reverse the tendency towards subjugation?   Rod 
genuinely favours giving priority to distributive rather than restorative justice which 
makes him a small-s, small-d social democrat. However, because he is uneasy about  
the state, Rod can also be called a diffident social democrat.  He musters much more 
enthusiasm for ideas and initiatives that empower individuals: acknowledgement that 
they constitute the state rather than vice-versa for example; affirmation of their status as 
legal agents rather than legal subjects; the provision to citizens of  opportunities and 
resources that will translate these concepts into practical reality; the “unbundling” of 
state  functions to make them more responsive to the needs and desires of citizens.   
Don’t misunderstand me.   Rod is no egoist, let alone a closet libertarian; he is not now 
nor has he ever been a  market fundamentalist.  It is just that he has laid out his own 
unique route to the moral high ground of social democracy, of distributive justice, by 




My “very idea” of Rod — perhaps mistaken — is that he has chosen that route partly 
because of his preferred methodologies, partly because of his temperament.  I’ll explore 
those two notions  in that order — methodology first.   Though he dazzles in almost any 
intellectual vernacular,  Rod’s  preferred methodologies seem to be  philosophy and 
poetry.   I’ve already mentioned that Aristotle’s concept of phronesis captures a central 
aspect of his approach to life and therefore to law.  That’s just one of many instances 
when he  uses philosophical methods to work towards his conclusions, and 
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philosophical concepts to encapsulate those conclusions in his memorable prose.  
Indeed,  I would argue that  Lessons from Everyday Law  is lodged firmly in the  
philosophic tradition of inductive argument from the observed experience of everyday 
life.   But Rod  is not just a philosopher.  He is also a poet, a skilled  practitioner of  
metaphor, allusion, allegory.   “Allegory”  he explains “… is a vehicle for phronesis, a 
form of expression that does not allow for a final propositional message that is separate 
from the story itself, easily transmissible, formulaic and universalized….” 6   — a form of 
expression, in other words, that ensures that  each reader, each listener, will have to 
pursue virtue by trying to understand themselves and others.   
 
A philosopher and a poet, then, but apparently not  an empirical social scientist.  For 
example, in a recent piece Rod and David Sandomiersky write   
…While we locate ourselves as legal pluralists, we nonetheless take our distance 
from empirical, social scientific conceptions of legal pluralism.7   
Indeed, Rod  takes his distance from empirical  social science in many similar 
statements. However, such  disclaimers must be taken with a grain of salt.  Rod — the 
savant sans frontières — is constitutionally incapable of taking his distance from any 
form of knowledge, any mode of analysis, that provides enlightenment.  For example,  
his wonderful essay, Office Politics,8 reveals him to be an anthropologist, an  
ethnomethodologist  of the first order; so does Lessons of Everyday Law.9   Moreover, 
his  understanding of institutions like federalism, of relationships like families, and of 
processes like law-making is  thoroughly grounded in empirical evidence including  (as 
his footnotes often reveal) evidence amassed by the very social scientists from whom 
he distances himself.    But I will concede that  the social sciences  are not Rod’s  
preferred mode of analysis.  This, as  he himself has acknowledged,10 constitutes 
something of a “paradox” for someone as deeply involved in society and social relations 
as Rod is.   That paradox can be resolved, I think,  by considering Rod’s relationship 





Here is how  the Macdonald-Sandomierski article I’ve just mentioned describes legal 
reality: 
Legal norms, in whatever site of law, are imagined by human beings, given 
expression by human beings, lived by human beings, followed by human beings, 
modified by human beings, rejected by human beings — in a word, constituted 
by human beings not primarily as passive legal subjects, but above all as active 
legal agents.11    
 
I have no problem with this formulation, so far as it goes, but there does seem to be  
something missing.   That missing element is power12 — power that permeates many 
sites of law, that warps human imaginations, that stunts freedom of expression, that 
prevents people from adhering to certain legal norms or forces them to do so against 
their will.   All too often, indeed, power trumps phronesis and determines whether 
human beings become passive legal subjects or active legal agents, or neither — but 
simply disenfranchised, debilitated or even dead.   I’ve made this point to Rod over the 
years:   
 … I have the sense [I wrote to him once] that you continue to overestimate the 
power of the individual, to underestimate the power of the state, class, culture 
and  corporation ….  I sense that a more tragic view of life, a recognition of  its  
large and little brutalities has to be introduced into your picture of identity-
negotiating citizens.13    
Rod responded by calling me a “tragic realist”.   I retaliated by calling him a “magic 
realist”.    On reflection, I think my flippant rejoinder was not far off the mark.     
Rod —  in his work as in  his life — engages with reality as a thoroughgoing  optimist or, 
as I call him, a magic realist.  By contrast, I’m at best a Gramscian optimist — an 
optimist of the will, but a pessimist of the  intellect.  I believe — like Gramsci and unlike 
Rod — that “man is … a product of history, not of nature.”   Seeing Rod as a magic 
realist  helps to explain a lot — especially his always-imaginative and well-conceived  
projects to levitate justice:  to mobilize ordinary Canadians in a bottom-up process of 
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law reform; to unbundle government programs to allow citizens to shape their own  
identity; to introduce a  new  “Swiss army knife of governance” that will ensure  social 
justice while preventing the growth of an overbearing state; to  invent a trans-systemic 
legal education that will not only be able to  resist the intense parochialism of the bar but 
ultimately transform  our understanding of law.   Truly, truly  I admire  the noble 
ambitions and imaginative design of each of  these  projects.  But they do represent a 
magical view of reality, a determined optimism that isn’t quite quixotic, but nonetheless 
fails to factor power into the equation.   Rod, I conclude, takes his distance from 
empirical social science because it is foreign to his nature and  (as he perceives it) at 
odds with the concept of phronesis that informs so much of his thinking. 
Let me illustrate this point by referring to Office Politics.  You’ll recall that that article 
concerns the allocation of newly-vacated offices in a law faculty. It is epistolary in form: 
it reproduces an imagined exchange of memos between the dean and faculty members 
asserting their claims to the office they think they deserve, as well as challenging the 
claims of others and in some cases impugning the dean’s fairness and good faith.  The 
narrative demonstrates, says Rod,  “the value of constitutive practice for reaffirming the 
subtle and informal normative orders that make associational life possible”.14  It’s his 
article, and he is entitled to draw his own conclusions.  However,  stated as it is, Rod’s  
conclusion confirms to me that he is indeed a magic realist.   Everyone in the story — 
save “the dean”, save Rod himself — seems utterly unconcerned about “associational 
life”.   On the contrary, each  faculty member seems to be driven not to improve the 
quality of collegial relations,  not to secure justice or virtue, but to expend  precious 
intellectual and moral capital  in an effort  to  enhance their personal comfort, 
convenience or prestige.    
One final example.   In the mid-1990s, Rod and I were members of the law program of 
the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research.  Fraser Mustard, the founder and 
director of the Institute, was incapable of conducting a conversation that did not include 
mention of “the gradient”.  The gradient in question was the product of a sophisticated 
epidemiological study, the Whitehall  Study, that closely linked health outcomes to 
socio-economic status.  Very crudely put, the gradient showed that the higher your 
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status,  the  better your prospects of living a long, healthy, productive and satisfying 
life.15  As a tragic realist, I  thought this was what Bora Laskin  used to call “a 
penetrating glimpse into the obvious”.   Indeed, the same gradient seemed to me to 
determine a whole host of outcomes from people’s political influence to their access to 
social and cultural goods to their enjoyment of legal rights.  However, mere mention of 
“the gradient” drove Rod to distraction.   There were other reasons no doubt, but at 
some level, I think,  Rod’s optimism, his magic realism,  would not allow him to accept 
the determinism implicit in the very notion of  a “gradient”.16  He just could not 
acknowledge that their socio-economic status is what makes some  people into  active 
legal agents and others into passive legal subjects.   
A new research agenda 
We’ve all been challenged to  identify the implications of Rod’s work  for future 
research.  I think I’ve now identified a key item on that agenda.  On the one hand,  we 
are all attracted by Rod’s commitment to phronesis, his vision of individuals as moral 
and legal agents:  it’s a vision that not only promises a better society for all of us but a 
better life for each of us — a life exemplified by the one Rod has made for himself.  But 
on the other hand, I’m surely not the only tragic realist in the room.  Many of us — Rod 
included — are deeply concerned about the powerful and destructive forces at loose in 
the world.  Many of us are convinced that power can seldom be challenged effectively 
by individuals — even exceptional individuals, even steadfast practitioners of  
phronesis.  And many of us are convinced that new and better forms of political, 
economic and social relations are essentially projects  that require collective action and, 
in many cases, state action.   So here is my nomination for a  future, Rod-inflected 
research question:  how can we push back the forces of injustice and selfishness, how 
can we mobilize for positive collective action, how can we create effective institutions 
and governments, how can we build a just society — without at the same time  
impairing our individual capacity, and denying our individual responsibility, for moral and 





I said at the outset that my “very idea” of Rod is necessarily autobiographical and 
therefore likely different from yours.  Now I want to shift my ground.  At  any academic 
gathering, the only person wearing a bow tie he has tied  with his own two hands is 
likely to be Rod.  In that sense,  the “very idea” of Rod begins for all of us with the man 
himself, with his unique human qualities,  with the  breadth of his interests and the 
depths of his understanding, with his unrelenting search for meaning and for justice.  All 
of these function as a bow tie.  They give his work remarkable intellectual coherence  
and  imprint it with a unique moral DNA.   If there were such a thing as a  blind tasting of 
legal scholarship, Rod’s work would be instantly recognizable.   That’s why I think I can 
conclude in a very matter-of-fact, non-maudlin way by saying that Rod is sui generis.   
He is one of Canada’s most conscientious and constructive citizens, one of its  most 
imaginative and influential scholars, and one of its most decent human beings.  That is 
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